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I.  Introduction 
 
The microfinance revolution has changed attitudes towards helping the poor in both Asia 
and Latin America and in some countries has provided substantial flows of credit, often 
to very low-income groups or households, who would normally be excluded by 
conventional financial institutions. Much has been written on the range of institutional 
arrangements pursued in different organizations and countries and in turn a vast number 
studies have attempted to assess the outreach and poverty impact of such schemes. 
However, amongst the academic development community there is a recognition that 
perhaps we know much less about the impact of these programs than might be expected 
given the enthusiasm for these activities in donor and policy-making circles. To quote a 
recent authoritative volume on microfinance 
 
 “MFI field operations have far surpassed the research capacity to analyze them, so 
excitement about the use of microfinance for poverty alleviation is not backed up with 
sound facts derived from rigorous research. Given the current state of knowledge, it is 
difficult to allocate confidently public resources to microfinance development.” (Zeller 
and Meyer 2002). 
 
This is a very strong statement of doubt and in part reflects lack of accurate data, but 
also in part methodological difficulties associated with assessing exactly what proportion 
of income and other effects on the beneficiaries of micro credit can actually be attributed 
to the programs themselves. Here we compare poverty impact studies from Asia and 
Latin America.  In particular we ask what is the evidence on three specific issues  
 
- the success of microfinance programs in reaching the core poor 
- the effectiveness of microfinance initiatives in pulling households out of poverty 
- the cost effectiveness of microfinance as a poverty targeting tool 
 
These are very basic questions and the fact that they can still be posed reflects the 
extent of uncertainty in the literature.  Since a number of other surveys are also available 
we give most attention to evidence produced in the last three or four years1 and highlight 
similarities and differences in microfinance as it has developed in Asia and Latin 
America.    
 
The paper is organized as follows. We first provide a brief overview of some of the 
distinguishing characteristics of the microfinance industry in Asia and Latin America.  
Section three discusses the potential for microfinance to combat poverty and 
methodological issues relating to assessing its success in doing so, and section four 
goes on to survey the evidence from selected research studies on this point.  Section 
five addresses the question of cost-effectiveness.  Finally we draw some brief 
conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 An earlier helpful survey published by ADBI is Meyer (2002). This draws out some of the methodological 
problems in assessing impact and surveys a number of important studies available at the time of writing 
(around 2001). Morduch (1999) is an extremely authoritative earlier survey focusing on both conceptual and 
empirical questions. 
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II.  Characteristics of Microfinance in Asia and Latin America 
 
Microfinance developed in Asia and Latin America under very different ideological, 
political and economic conditions.  Hence, there are distinctive differences in the 
microfinance industry in the two regions.  A brief look at the history of two of the most 
famous MFIs: the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and Banco Sol in Bolivia, gives an 
informative picture of how the industry in the two regions can be characterized.      
 
Modern microfinance was born in Bangladesh in the 1970s, in the aftermath of the 
country’s war of independence, when Muhammad Yunus, an economics professor at the 
University of Chittagong, began an experimental research project providing credit to the 
rural poor of Bangladesh.  That experiment driven by a strong sense of developmental 
idealism developed into what is now the world’s most famous microfinance institution, 
the Grameen Bank, and institutions that replicate its pioneering methodology worldwide.   
 
Microfinance in Latin America developed under quite different conditions.  In Bolivia, a 
collapsing populist regime led to widespread unemployment.  Banco Sol, a pioneering 
microfinance institution in the region, developed to address the problem of urban 
unemployment and provide credit to the cash-strapped informal sector. The notion of 
commercial profitability was embraced relatively early in this approach. 
 
As a result of the different conditions under which the very first microfinance institutions 
were founded, the industry in the two regions developed distinctive characteristics.  In 
the beginning, “ by comparison with Bangladesh, the Bolivian intervention was typically 
urban rather than rural, less concerned with poverty and more focused on micro-
enterprise. It targeted the ‘economically active poor’ – people with established 
businesses that needed capital to grow. … from the start, Bolivian microcredit was itself 
seen as a business, potentially as a branch of commercial banking “  (Rutherford (2003) 
p.5).  Many of these differences still characterize the industry in the two regions today. 
  
For example, data from various sources suggest that Asian MFIs lead the world in terms 
of both breadth (number of clients) and depth (relative poverty of clients) of outreach.  In 
their analysis of over 1,500 microfinance institutions from 85 developing countries, 
Lapeneu and Zeller (2001) find Asia accounted for the majority of MFIs, retained the 
highest volume of savings and credit, and served more members than any other 
continent.  The most recent data from the Microbanking Bulletin2, reinforces these 
findings.  Average size of loans and deposits are often taken as a simple proxy of depth 
of outreach.  By this criteria Asian MFIs have among the lowest Loan and Savings 
Balance per Borrower, even after adjusting for GNP per capita, suggesting that they are 
effectively reaching the poor.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Microbanking Bulletin reports only data on a limited number of MFIs who choose to participate.  Those 
reporting to the Bulletin are thought to be amongst the best and are therefore unlikely to be representative of 
the industry as a whole (Meyer 2002: 14).    
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Table 1: Outreach Indicators by Region 
 Average  
Loan Balance  
per Borrower (US$)
Average  
Saving Balance 
per Saver (US$) 
Africa 228 105 
Asia 195 39 
Eastern Europe/ Central Asia 590 N/a 
Latin America 581 741 
Middle East/  
North Africa 
286 N/a 
                 Source: Microbanking Bulletin Issue #9, July 2003 
 
The same data indicates that Latin American MFIs are ahead of Asia in terms of 
financial viability.   On average, Latin American MFIs registered with the Microbanking 
Bulletin show a higher return in Asia. Latin America MFIs are also further advanced in 
the process of drawing in external funding through savings deposits with registered MFIs 
on average in the region have a deposit-loan ratio of 29%, which is roughly double the 
comparable figure for Asia (Ramirez 2004).  
 
Regional data of course covers up some wide disparities within each region.  
Microfinance is highly concentrated industry and the giants of the industry - BRI, BRAC 
and ASA – account for more than 50% of the total number of borrowers from the more 
than 300 MFIs worldwide, who report to the MIX Market. BRI alone accounts for nearly 
40% of their gross loans. Within Asia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand and Viet Nam 
have the largest number of members served and the largest distribution of loans and 
mobilization of savings in terms of GNP in the world.  In contrast, the two most populated 
countries in Asia, India and the PRC, have very low outreach, despite a high 
concentration of the region’s poor.   In Latin America, there is very strong skew with 
MFIs playing a major role as financial providers to micro-enterprise in Bolivia and Central 
America, but being largely insignificant in the larger countries of Brazil, Mexico and 
Argentina.  There is wide disparity in terms of financial viability as well.  Within Latin 
America there is a wide range, with the larger MFIs showing a return on assets in 2001-
02 well above the average for the commercial banking sector in their countries and that 
of the smaller MFIs in the region, which on average operate at a substantial financial 
loss when capital costs are calculated at commercial rates.   
 
The strong financial performance of larger MFIs in Latin America is linked with a trend 
toward commercialization of microfinance in the region.  In 1992 Banco Sol became the 
first example of an NGO transformation to a commercial bank and thus became the first 
regulated microfinance bank.  Banco Sol surpassed other Bolivian banks in profitability 
and became the first MFI to access international capital markets.  Following this 
successful example, at least 39 other important NGOs worldwide transformed into 
commercial banks over the period 1992- 2003 (Fernando (2003)).  Given that the failure 
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of commercial financial institutions to reach the poor provided the initial impetus for 
MFIs, this new trend is paradoxical and raises the question of whether the initial poverty 
reduction objectives of the transformed NGOs will be subjugated to commercial criteria 
(so-called ‘mission drift’). This potential disadvantage is still unexplored empirically, but 
the advantages of transformation are clear:  increased access to funding and regulatory 
authority freeing the institutions from dependence on donor-funds and capital constraints 
on growth and allowing them to offer a wider range of financial services.   
 
There is also a recent trend in the opposite direction – traditional banks getting involved 
in microfinance in a variety of ways.  In both regions there are example of large state 
banks that have moved into microfinance, for example, Banco Nacional de Costa Rica 
and Bank Rakyat Indonesia’s (BRI) Micro Business Division.3  Recently there is a similar 
trend in the private banking sector as well.  Until it was closed in April 2004 for 
noncompliance with prudential regulation, Bank Dagang Bali (BDB) was an early 
example of commercial banking involvement in microfinance in Indonesia.  Rural banks 
in the Philippines are the dominant providers of microfinance and the USAID funded 
Microenterprise Access to Banking Services (MABS) program aims to assist 
participating rural banks in expanding the services they provide to the micro-enterprise 
sector.  Pakistan has established a number of private commercial banks that provide 
retail microfinancial services. Malaysia, Nepal and Thailand also have programs in effect 
to encourage commercial bank involvement in microfinance.4    In Latin America, Banco 
Agricola Comercial (El Salvador), Banco del Desarrollo (Chile) and Banco Wiese (Peru) 
and Banco Empresarial (Guatemala) are examples of private commercial banks that are 
involved in varying degrees with microfinance.  Falling in between state involvement and 
private commercial initiatives is a program in India started by the National Bank of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), under which a number of private banks 
in India have become involved in microfinance.  ICICI Bank in particular has 
experimented with some innovative approaches to microfinance involvement under the 
NABARD program.  These trends place microfinance squarely within the conventional 
financial sector and raise important issues of governance and regulation in connection 
with the new institutions.  
 
 In both regions therefore we see similar trends towards a provision of a wider range of 
financial services, a move away from traditional group lending to individual loans, and in 
summary a greater shift towards commercialization of the sector, with Latin America 
more advanced in this process. However in both regions NGOs remain important 
providers and in Asia they are still the dominant mode of delivery. The NGO sector is 
still, with exceptions, not financially sustainable and continues to rely on subsidies of 
various sorts.  In these circumstances, of what seems a fragmenting MFI sector in many 
countries with a division between NGO-based lending and a commercially- driven 
banking operation, there is a strong need for studies that shed light on the poverty 
consequences of different modalities. If NGOs are to continue to draw on subsidized 
finance there is a need to demonstrate that they can reach the poor and do so in a cost- 
                                                 
3 Patten et al (2001) find evidence that the micro finance side of the Indonesian banking system performed 
much more robustly during the macro crises of the late 1990’s than did the commercial banking sector. 
 
4 In Sri Lanka, the microfinance sector is highly subsidized, discouraging entry by private commercial banks, 
but Hatton National Banks (HNB), Seylan Bank and Sampath Bank have become involved in the sector.  
However, Charitonenko, Campion and Fernando (2004) report that combined their microloans accounted for 
1.2% of the industry total at the end of 2000 and that none of the microfinance programs are profitable, so 
the future of involvement of private commercial banks in microfinance in Sri Lanka is questionable.   
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effective manner, as compared with other forms of poverty targeting interventions. If 
public policy is to encourage the transformation of NGOs to regulated financial 
institutions or if the delivery of small loans is to be left to the commercial banking sector, 
the concern that the client base will change so that poor clients are excluded by 
application of tighter commercial criteria must be addressed. In such instances there is a 
need to learn more about the poverty consequences of the ongoing changes in the MFI 
sector in many countries. 
 
III.  Poverty and Microfinance 
 
Here we define poverty as an income (or more broadly welfare) level below a socially 
acceptable minimum and microfinance as one of a range of innovative financial 
arrangements designed attract the poor as either borrowers or savers. In terms of 
understanding poverty a simple distinction can be drawn within the group ‘the poor’ 
between the long-term or ‘chronic poor’ and those who temporarily fall into poverty as a 
result of adverse shocks, the ‘transitory poor’. Within the chronic poor one can further 
distinguish between those who are either so physically or socially disadvantaged that 
without welfare support they will always remain in poverty (the ‘destitute’) and the larger 
group who are poor because of their lack of assets and opportunities. Furthermore within 
the non-destitute category one may distinguish by the depth of poverty (that is how far 
households are below the poverty line) with those significantly below it representing the 
‘core poor’, sometimes categorized by the irregularity of their income. In some Latin 
American cases for example the core poor or destitute are taken to be those below 50% 
of the poverty line (although Latin American poverty lines are generally higher than in 
Asia) 
 
In principle, microfinance can relate to the chronic (non-destitute) poor and to the 
transitory poor in different ways. The condition of poverty has been interpreted 
conventionally as one of lack of access by poor households to the assets necessary for 
a higher standard of income or welfare, whether assets are thought of as human (access 
to education), natural (access to land), physical (access to infrastructure), social (access 
to networks of obligations) or financial (access to credit) (World Bank 2000:34).  Lack of 
access to credit is readily understandable in terms of the absence of collateral that the 
poor can offer conventional financial institutions, in addition to the various complexities 
and high costs involved in dealing with large numbers of small, often illiterate, borrowers. 
The poor have thus to rely on loans from either moneylenders at high interest rates or 
friends and family, whose supply of funds will be limited. Microfinance institutions 
attempt to overcome these barriers through innovative measures such as group lending 
and regular savings schemes, as well as the establishment of close links between poor 
clients and staff of the institutions concerned. The range of possible relationships and 
the mechanisms employed are very wide.  
 
The case for microfinance as a mechanism for poverty reduction is simple. If access to 
credit can be improved, it is argued, the poor can finance productive activities that will 
allow income growth, provided there are no other binding constraints. This is a route out 
of poverty for the non-destitute chronic poor. For the transitory poor, who are vulnerable 
to fluctuations in income that bring them close to or below the poverty line, microfinance 
provides the possibility of credit at times of need and in some schemes the opportunity 
of regular savings by a household itself that can be drawn on. The avoidance of sharp 
declines in family expenditures by drawing on such credit or savings allows 
‘consumption smoothing.’ In practice this distinction between the needs of the chronic 
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and transitory poor for credit for ‘promotional’ (that is income creating) and ‘protectional’ 
(consumption smoothing) purposes, respectively, is over-simplified since the chronic 
poor will also have short term needs that have to be met, whether it is due to income 
shortfalls or unexpected expenditures like medical bills or social events like weddings or 
funerals. It is one of the most interesting generalizations to emerge from the micro 
finance and poverty literature that the poorest of the chronic poor (the core poor) will 
borrow essentially for protectional purposes given both the low and irregular nature of 
their income. This group, it is suggested, will be too risk averse to borrow for promotional 
measures (that is for investment in the future) and will therefore be only a very limited 
beneficiary of microfinance schemes (Hulme and Mosley 1996: 132). 
 
The view that it is the less badly-off poor who benefit principally from microfinance has 
become highly influential and, for example, was repeated in the World Development 
Report on poverty  (World Bank 2000:75). Apart from the risk aversion argument noted 
above a number of other explanations for this outcome have been put forward. A related 
issue refers to the interest rates charged to poor borrowers. Most microfinance schemes 
charge close to market-clearing interest rates (although these will often not be enough to 
ensure full cost-recovery given the high cost per loan of small-scale lending).  It may be 
that, even setting aside the risk-aversion argument, such high rates are unaffordable to 
the core poor given their lack of complementary inputs; in other words, despite having a 
smaller amount of capital marginal returns to the core poor may be lower than for the 
better-off poor. If the core poor cannot afford high interest rates they will either not take 
up the service or take it up and get into financial difficulties. Also where group lending is 
used, the very poor may be excluded by other members of the group, because they are 
seen as a bad credit risk, jeopardizing the position of the group as a whole. Alternatively, 
where professional staff operate as loan officers, they may exclude the very poor from 
borrowing, again on grounds of repayment risk. In combination these factors, it is felt by 
many, explain the weakness of microfinance in reaching the core poor.5 The sector has 
responded in a number of cases by establishing special programs for the core or ‘ultra 
poor’. The best known of these are in Bangladesh and involve the well-established 
institutions of BRAC and ASA. The programs essentially aim to provide a range of 
services, covering training, health provision and more general social development for the 
disadvantaged, as well as grants of assets or credits. The ultra poor are encouraged to 
build up a savings fund and to graduate to conventional microfinance programs. Other 
variants of this approach involve greater flexibility in repayment terms for the poorest 
(Fernando 2004). 
 
Given the new trends in the sector and their possible effect in diluting the original poverty 
focus of MFIs, the question of their impact on the poor (and particularly the core poor) is 
clearly of great policy interest. It might be thought that if such institutions are designed to 
serve only poor clients and if repayment rates are high, no further detailed analysis is 
needed. Such a view is misleading for a number of reasons. First, there is no guarantee 
that only the poor will be served unless strong eligibility criteria (like land ownership) are 
enforced. Often the aim is to dissuade the non-poor by the inconvenience of frequent 
                                                 
5 An important attempt to address this problem has been the Income Generation for Vulnerable Group 
Development (IGVGD) program run by BRAC in Bangladesh, which combines measures of livelihood 
protection (food aid) with measures of livelihood promotion (skills training and micro credit). Hence micro 
credit is provided as part of a package approach. Matin and Hulme (2003) survey the evidence on how far 
the benefits of this program actually reach the core poor and conclude that although the program was more 
successful than more conventional micro credit schemes none the less many target households were still 
missed.  
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meetings or the stigma of being a member of a credit group of the poor. Such 
disincentives need not work and eligibility criteria, where they exist, may not be 
enforced. Second, high repayment rates may be due to social pressure within a group or 
family and may not reflect the capacity to repay (if for example loans from moneylenders 
have to be taken out to repay the microcredit). Third, even if the poor are genuinely 
served by MFIs as long a public funds are required to finance the MFI there is the issue 
of how cost-effective this means of reaching the poor is compared with alternatives. This 
requires a comparison of the cost of transferring the funds through a micro credit 
institution per unit of benefit received by the target group, as compared with the benefit-
cost ratio for alternative schemes for reaching the core poor, such as food subsidies, 
workfare, and integrated regional development initiatives. Such comparisons must take 
account of not just the administrative costs involved, but also the leakage rate (that is the 
benefits to the non-poor).  
   
 Hence for these reasons there is a strong case for attempting to assess both the depth 
of outreach of microfinance programs, the impact of access to microfinance services on 
the welfare of clients and the costs of achieving this impact. 
 
On the first point, assessing the depth of outreach or access of the poor to microfinance 
programs, it is important to note from the outset that most MFIs probably do not consider 
their institutional mission to be serving the poorest of the poor.  Particularly in Latin 
America, most MFIs report a broader agenda to provide financial services to poor 
communities or specific groups such as female entrepreneurs who would not otherwise 
have access.  Among MFIs that report to the Mix Market, slightly less than half of those 
in Asia identified “specifically targeting very poor clients” as their institutional mission.  In 
Latin America, the share is even smaller: only around 10%.  Of the Latin American MFIs 
that claim to target very poor clients, only two use some sort of targeting tool to identify 
clients.  In Asia, most of the MFIs that specifically target the very poor use some sort of 
targeting tool, such as a means test, participatory wealth ranking or a housing index to 
identify the target group.   
 
For those MFIs that do explicitly aim to serve the poorest within their community, recent 
work on poverty outreach of MFIs has focused on constructing a poverty index that can 
be used to establish whether the target group is being reached. The Consultative Group 
to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) has developed a poverty assessment tool (PAT) that can 
be used to compare clients and non-clients of MFIs in the same community. This is 
based on the construction of a weighted index of poverty based on a range of indicators 
covering the human resources of households, characteristics of their dwellings, 
measures of food security and their assets.  The different indicators are weighted by 
principal components analysis, which allows weights to differ between cases (Zeller et al 
2001). The approach here is to sort a non-client sample into three equal groups (high, 
intermediate and low) on the basis of their poverty score. The poverty index scores at 
the cut-off points between the three groups then become a reference point for the client 
or participant sample and their distribution between the three categories can be 
compared with that of the non-clients. As the non-client groups are divided equally, any 
deviation from equal proportions amongst the clients signals a skew either for or against 
greater poverty outreach.6  
                                                 
6 CGAP reports that the CGAP-PAT has been used to assess the relative poverty level of clients of 7 MFIs - 
2 of these are in Asia and 2 in Latin America.  Three of these MFIs who explicitly identify serving the poorest 
of the poor as an institutional mission appear to be succeeding in that goal.  Institutions with broader goals 
 9
The PAT is an outreach, as compared with an impact, assessment and therefore does 
not directly address the question of what impact the programs have on their clients. 
Conducting a rigorous impact assessment is challenging.  It is not simply a case of 
looking at a group of borrowers, observing their income change after they took out micro 
loans and establishing who has risen above the poverty line. Accurate assessment 
requires a rigorous test of the counterfactual – that is how income (or whatever measure 
is used) with a microcredit compares with what it would be without it, with the only 
difference in both cases being the availability of credit. This requires empirically a control 
group identical in characteristics to the recipients of credit and engaged in the same 
productive activities, who have not received credit, and whose income (or other 
measure) can be traced through time to compare with that of the credit recipients.  
 
A practitioner-friendly impact assessment toolkit is also available: the result of the 
Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services (AIMS) Project.  This assessment tool 
has been used in longitudinal studies of the impact of programs in Peru (Mibanco), India 
(SEWA) and Zimbabwe (Zambuko Trust).  This procedure looks at change over time and 
matches pairs of observations between borrowers and members of a control group, 
where each pair have similar starting values for the impact variable (like income or sales 
revenue) and other characteristics, like age, gender or sector of activity.  Simplifying, this 
approach identifies impact as: 
 
Impact   =   1/n Σ (Yt+1   -  Yt )p 
 
Where Yt and Y t+1 are an impact variable (like income) in period t and t +1 respectively, 
p refers to matched pairs of borrowers and non-borrowers, where there are n pairs. Thus 
impact can be rationalized as the average difference between matched pairs of program 
participants and control group.7 Where impact is greater than zero (and statistically 
significant) microfinance will have made a difference and once again initially poor and 
non-poor borrowers can be distinguished in the analysis. The weakness in the 
applications of approach to date is that researchers have only been able to control for 
observable characteristics.  
 
Failure to account for unobservable characteristics may lead to biased measures of 
impact.  Two key sources of bias can arise in empirical work that attempts to assess the 
impact of microcredit on poor households – selection bias and placement bias.  The 
former arises where there are key differences between borrowers and non-borrowers 
that cannot be observed, measured and allowed for, with self-selection bias (that is 
where those with particular characteristics choose to participate in a program) a key 
problem. Hence whilst differences in education, age or gender can be controlled for 
statistically there can also be differences in attitude to risk or ‘entrepreneurship’, which 
will be basically unobservable. A bias will arise if there is an association between a 
decision to take a micro loan and these unobserved characteristics. Hence if the more 
entrepreneurial individuals are those who take out loans, growth in their income relative 
to income of those who have not taken out a loan may be due in part to the effect of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
tended to serve a clientele that is more representative of the communities in which they operate, which may 
or may not be poorer than the national average.     
7 The analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) essentially allows separate parallel regression lines to be fitted 
through the data for the treatment (borrower) and control groups. The regression lines measure the outcome 
variable for a given year (t + n) relative to an earlier year (t). Insofar as a program like microcredit has a 
tangible effect this will be picked up by the distance between the two lines, that is by the difference in 
intercept terms. The statistical significance of this distance gives a test for the impact of the program. 
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loan itself, but in part to their entrepreneurial ability. Attribution of all of the change to the 
loan will overstate its impact.  Placement bias arises where loans go to locations or 
activities that are in some way favored, such as villages with better infrastructure or 
sectors with strong demand growth. Comparing income change for households in a 
superior location (or sector) who have a loan, with income change for similar households 
in another location (or sector), who have not taken out a loan, and attributing of all this to 
the loan will create an upward bias.  
 
Best-practice approaches to resolving these problems employ a form of “difference-in-
difference” (two-stage least squares instrumental variables) analysis that compares 
participants and a similar control group and between locations or sectors with and 
without access to the program.8 One approach (as used for example by Pitt and 
Khandker (1998) on Bangladesh) is to use exogenous eligibility criteria for participation 
in a microfinance program (for example lack of land ownership) as a means of avoiding 
a self-selection bias. Placement bias is allowed for by comparing those who are eligible 
with those who are ineligible, both in villages that are covered by programs and those 
that are not. Hence the analysis based on a double difference can be simplified as 
follows 
 
Impact  =  (Yep  -  Yip)  -   (Yen -  Yin)   
 
Where Y is change in an outcome measure (such as income) over the study period, e 
and i stand for eligible and ineligible households, respectively, and p and n stand for 
program and non-program villages, respectively. For microfinance to produce positive 
results Impact must be greater than zero. If poor and non-poor borrowers can be 
identified, there will be a quantification of poverty impact. 
 
 The chief problem with this approach is that many microfinance schemes do not use 
formal eligibility criteria and those that do may not always enforce them, creating a 
further source of error. An alternative where no formal criteria are set out but approvals 
for borrowing are known is to use as a control group those approved for loans who have 
not yet taken them up (for example as used by Mosley and Hulme (1996) in their country 
studies). This address the self-selection issue unless not taking up a loan reveals an 
aversion to risk and is correlated with subsequent outcomes.  
 
 A variant of this approach (as applied by Coleman (1999, 2004) for Thailand) draws on 
the fact that most microfinance activities start in a narrowly defined area and then 
expand their coverage to similar villages elsewhere or within urban centers. In the rural 
case, if the villages are similar and if the borrowers can choose to participate, then self-
selecting participants in villages that have been identified for later inclusion in a program 
should provide an accurate control group for current borrowers in villages with a 
program. Here, again simplifying, this is equivalent to estimating impact as  
 
Impact  =  (YPt+1  -  YNt+1) - (YPt  -  YNt)   
 
Where Y is as before, P and N stand for (self-selecting) participants and non-participants 
respectively, t stands for time a program has been operative in a particular village, so t + 
1 covers the early and t the late entrant villages. 
                                                 
8 This discussion draws extensively on Coleman (2001). 
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Here we examine some of the recent ‘rigorous’ studies on the impact of MFIs based on 
survey data that employ versions of these methodologies. We do not report the results of 
work based on more qualititative or participatory approaches.9 Table 2 summarizes the 
results of the studies surveyed here for Asia and table 3 does the same for Latin 
America. In general it is perhaps not surprising that studies based on a rigorous 
counterfactual find much smaller gains from microfinance than simple unadjusted before 
and after type comparisons, which erroneously attribute all gains to micro credit. Also 
although the results are far from consistent, studies on Asia tend to report a stronger 
poverty impact from microfinance than do comparable work from Latin America. 
 
 
Table 2 Microfinance Impact Studies: Asia 
Study Coverage  Methodology Results 
Hulme and 
Mosley 
(1996) 
Indonesia 
(BKK, KURK, 
BRI), India 
(Regional 
Rural Banks), 
Bangladesh  
(Grameen, 
BRAC, 
TRDEP), Sri 
Lanka 
(PTCCS) 
Borrowers and control 
samples, before and 
after. 
Growth of incomes of 
borrowers always exceeds that 
of control group. Increase in 
borrowers income larger for 
better-off borrowers. 
MkNelly et 
al  (1996) 
Thailand 
(village banks 
- Credit with 
Education) 
Non-participants in non-
program villages used as 
controls 
Positive benefits, but no 
statistical tests for differences 
reported. 
Khandker 
(1998) 
Bangladesh 
(Grameen, 
BRAC) 
Double difference 
comparison between 
eligible and ineligible 
households and between 
program and non-
program villages 
5% of participant households 
removed from poverty 
annually. Additional 
consumption of 18 taka for 
every 100 taka of loan taken 
out by women. 
                                                 
9 See Hulme (1999) for a discussion of different approaches to impact.  
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Pitt and 
Khandker 
(1998) 
Bangladesh 
(BRAC, 
BRDB, 
Grameen 
Bank) 
Double difference 
estimation between 
eligible and non-eligible 
households and 
programs with and 
without microfinance 
programs. Estimations 
are conducted separately 
for male and female 
borrowing. 
Positive impact of program 
participation on total weekly 
expenditure per capita, 
women’s nonland assets and 
women’s labor supply.  
Strong effect of female 
participation in Grameen Bank 
on schooling of girls 
Credit programs can change 
village attitudes and other 
village characteristics  
Coleman 
(1999) 
Thailand 
(village 
banks)  
Double difference 
comparison between 
participant and non-
participant households 
and between villages in 
which program 
introduced and villages 
where not yet introduced 
No evidence of program 
impact. Village bank 
membership no impact on 
asset or income variables.  
Chen and 
Snodgrass 
(2001) 
India (SEWA 
bank) 
Control group from same 
geographic area 
Average income increase rose 
for bank’s clients in comparison 
with control group. Little overall 
change in incidence of poverty, 
but substantial movement 
above and below poverty line.  
Coleman 
(2004) 
Thailand 
(village 
banks) 
Double difference 
estimation between 
participants and non-
participants and villages 
with and without 
microfinance program 
Programs are not reaching the 
poor as much as they reach 
relatively wealthy people. 
Impact is larger on richer 
committee members rather 
than on rank-and-file members. 
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Park and 
Ren (2001) 
PRC (NGOs, 
government 
programs, 
mixed NGO-
government 
programs)  
(i) Probit estimation of 
participation and 
eligibility for each type of 
program; (ii) OLS and IV 
estimation of impact of 
microcredit on household 
income 
In NGO and mixed programs 
the very rich even if eligible (for 
mixed programs) are excluded 
from participation. In the 
government program the rich 
are both eligible and more 
likely to participate. Impact 
estimation finds evidence of 
positive impact of microcredit 
on income. 
Duong and 
Izumida 
(2002) 
Viet Nam 
(VBA 84% of 
total lending), 
VBP, PCFs, 
commercial 
banks, public 
funds)  
Tobit estimation of (i) 
participation in rural 
credit market; (ii) 
behavior of lender toward 
credit-constrained 
household and (iii) 
weighted least square 
estimation for impact on 
output supply.  
Poor have difficulties in 
accessing credit facilities: 
livestock and farming land are 
determinants of household 
participation; reputation and 
amount of credit applied for to 
MFI are determinants of credit 
rationing by lenders. Impact 
estimation showed positive 
correlation between credit and 
output. 
Kaboski 
and 
Townsend 
(2002) 
Thailand 
(production 
credit groups, 
rice banks, 
women 
groups, 
buffalo banks) 
Two-staged LS and MLE 
test of microfinance 
impact on asset growth, 
probability of reduction in 
consumption in bad 
years, probability of 
becoming moneylender, 
probability of starting 
business and probability 
of changing job. 
Separate estimation 
according to type of MFI 
Production credit groups and 
women groups combined with 
training and savings have 
positive impact on asset 
growth, although rice banks 
and buffalo banks have 
negative impacts. Emergency 
services, training and savings 
help to smooth responses to 
income shock. Women groups 
help to reduce reliance on 
moneylenders. 
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and policies of MFI 
Amin et.al. 
(2003) 
Bangladesh 
(Grameen 
Bank, BRAC, 
ASA) 
1) Nonparametric test of 
stochastic dominance of 
average monthly 
consumption of members 
and nonmembers  
2) Maximum likelihood 
test of microcredit 
membership on 
vulnerability, 
consumption and 
household 
characteristics.   
Members are poorer than 
nonmembers. Programs are 
more successful at reaching 
poor, but less successful at 
reaching vulnerable. Poor 
vulnerable are effectively 
excluded from membership. 
Gertler 
et.al. 
(2003) 
Indonesia 
(Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia, 
Bank Kredit 
Desa, 
commercial 
banks) 
1) Basic consumption-
smoothing test on 
household’s ability to 
perform daily living 
activities (ADL Index) 
2) State dependence 
tests of basic regression 
(relative man-woman 
earning, physical job, 
savings)  
2) Test of geographical 
proximity to financial 
institutions on 
consumption smoothing 
Significantly positive correlation 
between household’s 
consumption and measure of 
health. 
Wealthier households are 
better insured against illness 
Households that live far from 
financial institutions suffer 
more from sudden reduction in 
consumption.  
Khandker 
(2003) 
Bangladesh 
(Grameen 
bank, BRAC, 
BRDB) 
1) Fixed effect Tobit 
estimation of borrowing 
dependent on land 
education endowments 
of households.  
Households who are poor in 
landholding and formal 
education tend to participate 
more  
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2) Panel data fixed 
effects IV estimation to 
define long-term impact 
of microfinance 
borrowing on 
expenditure, non-land 
assets and poverty 
(moderate and extreme) 
Microfinance helps to reduce 
extreme poverty much more 
than moderate poverty (18 
percentage points as 
compared with 8.5 percentage 
points over 7 years). Welfare 
impact is also positive for all 
households, including non-
participants, as there are 
spillover effects.  
Pitt et al 
(2003) 
Bangladesh 
(BRAC, 
BRDB, 
Grameen 
Bank) 
Maximum likelihood 
estimation controlling for 
endogeneity of individual 
participation and of the 
placement of 
microfinance programs. 
Impact variables are 
health of boys and girls 
(arm circumference, 
body mass index and 
height-for-age) 
Significantly positive effect of 
female credit on height-for-age 
and arm circumference of both 
boys and girls. Borrowing by 
men has either negative or 
non-significant impact on 
health of children. 
 
Table 3 Microfinance Impact Studies:  Latin America 
Study Coverage Methodology Results 
Hulme and Mosley 
(1996) 
Bolivia, BancoSol Borrowers and 
control samples, 
before and after. 
Retrospective 
assessment of 
incomes. 
Growth of incomes 
of borrowers always 
exceeds that of 
control group. 
Absolute increase in 
borrowers income 
larger for better-off 
borrowers. 
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Mosley (2001) Bolivia, BancoSol, 
ProMujer, PRODEM 
and SARTAWA 
Borrowers and 
control samples, 
before and after. 
Time series data for 
BancoSol only; for 
other retrospective 
assessment of 
incomes. 
Growth of incomes 
and assets of 
borrowers always 
exceeds that of 
control group. 
Increase in 
borrowers income 
larger for better-off 
borrowers. No 
evidence of impact 
on ‘extreme poverty’
Banegas et al 
(2002) 
Ecuador, Banco 
Solidario and 
Bolivia, Caja de los 
Andes 
Logit model. Control 
group selected from 
households working 
in the same sector 
but with no loans 
from other 
institutions. 
Being a client of a 
program is 
associated with 
rising incomes. 
Dunn and Arbuckle 
(2001a, 2001b) 
Peru, Mibanco Logitudinal study 
using ‘analysis of 
covariance’ 
methodology; 
control group based 
on non-participants 
with similar 
observable 
characteristics to 
participants. Focus 
on microenterprises 
Microenterprises of 
participants found to 
have substantial 
increases in net 
income, assets and 
employments 
relative to those of 
non-participants. 
Positive impact on 
poverty reduction 
with incomes in 
participating 
households rising 
relative to control 
group. Poor 
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participants more 
likely to sell assets 
in face of a shock 
than control 
households. 
MkNelly and 
Dunford (1999) 
Bolivia, Credit with 
Education program 
Longitudinal study 
of comparison with 
baseline for 
nutritional data. 
Control group of 
communities who 
would be offered 
same program two 
years later. 
No evidence of 
improvements in 
household food 
security or 
nutritional status of 
client’s children 
relative to the 
control group. 
 
III.1.  Poverty Impact Studies - Asia 
 
One of the early and most widely cited of the poverty impact studies is Hulme and 
Mosley (1996). This employs a control group approach looking at the changes in income 
for households in villages with microfinance programs and changes for similar 
households (for example, in terms of initial income, gender, education, and location) in 
non-program areas. As far as possible the control groups are drawn from households 
eligible for loans and who had been approved for loans by the institutions concerned, 
who had not yet received a loan. Programs in a number of countries are considered 
including the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI). In 
general a positive impact is found on borrower incomes of the poor (1988-92) with on 
average an increase over the control groups ranging from 10-12% in Indonesia, to 
around 30% in Bangladesh and India  (Hulme and Mosley 1996, table 8.1). Gains are 
larger for non-poor borrowers, however, and within the group the poor gains are 
negatively correlated with income. However, despite the breadth of the study and its use 
of control group techniques, it has been criticized for possible placement bias, whereby 
microfinance programs may be drawn to better placed villages, so that part of the 
advantage relative to the control group may be due to this more favorable location. The 
quality and accuracy of some of the data, particularly in relation to the representative 
nature of the control groups, has been questioned (Morduch 1999:1600). There also 
appears to be a basic problem with the data side of the case studies, since these are not 
based on a comparison between baseline data and that for a later survey year. Rather 
there is at least partial recourse to a recall approach for the earlier years of the period 
covered, as respondents are asked to estimate their income retrospectively. Finally the 
major conclusion of the study that there is a positive correlation of gains from 
microfinance with income, so that poorer borrowers gain proportionately less, has also 
been challenged on the grounds that their comparison of income changes for different 
categories of borrowers biases their results in favor of the conclusion.  This follows since 
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gains for different income groups are compared with the average for a control group, not 
with the change for comparable income categories within the control group; in other 
words gains to very poor borrowers are compared with average gains in the control 
group not to the gains to the very poor controls (Morduch 2003). 
 
Another major early initiative that has provided some of the firmest empirical work were 
the surveys conducted in the 1990’s by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies 
(BIDS) and the World Bank; these provided the data for several major analyses, such as 
Pitt and Khandker (1998).  Khandker (1998) summarizes a number of different studies 
conducted in Bangladesh using the 1991/92 survey and focusing on three major micro-
finance programs, including the Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC). As discussed above impact is assessed using a double-difference 
approach between eligible and ineligible households (with holdings of land of more than 
half an acre making households ineligible) and between program and non-program 
villages. After controlling for other factors, such as various household characteristics, 
any remaining difference is attributed to the microfinance programs. The study draws a 
number of conclusions, but the main one is that the program had a positive effect on 
household consumption, which was significantly greater for female borrowers. On 
average a loan of 100 taka to a female borrower, after it is repaid, allows a net 
consumption increases of 18 taka. In terms of poverty impact it is estimated that 5% of 
participant households are pulled above the poverty line annually.  
 
Khandker (2003) follows up this earlier work by employing panel data. He uses the BIDS 
- World Bank survey conducted in 1998-99 that traced the same households from the 
1991-92 survey.  He finds apparently strong and positive results. Whilst borrowing by 
males appears to have no significant impact on consumption, that by females, who are 
the dominant client group, does have a positive impact. From this analysis a 100 taka 
loan to a female client leads to a 10.5 taka increase in consumption (compared with 18 
taka in the earlier analysis). Allowing for the impact of higher consumption on poverty 
gives estimates of poverty impact. It is estimated that due to participation in micro 
finance programs moderate poverty among program participants decreased 8.5 
percentage points over the period of seven years and extreme poverty dropped about 18 
points over the same period.10 He also finds evidence of positive spillovers on non-
program participants in the villages, with the impact greater for those in extreme poverty. 
Over the study period of seven years poverty for non-participants is found to decline by 1 
percentage point due to the programs, whilst extreme poverty declines by nearly 5 
percentage points. This impact is due solely to female borrowing. 
 
The same data set has also been used to identify health impacts as opposed to 
income changes. Pitt et al (2003) find that credit going to females has a large and 
significant impact in two out of three health measures for children. Male borrowing has 
no such effect. For example, a 10% increase in credit to females increases the arm 
circumference of daughters by 6.3%. A 10% increase in female credit on average 
increases the height of girls by 0.36 cm annually and of boys by 0.50 cms. The relations 
are stronger for daughters than sons. Hence in Bangladesh micro credit and improved 
family health appear to be related. 
                                                 
10 Poverty is based on a calorie intake of 2112 and extreme poverty on one of 1739. 
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These are strong and positive results and probably are the clearest evidence there is 
that microfinance is working in the way intended to bring sustained relief from poverty. 
However a couple of caveats are in order. First, the accuracy of the original results as 
presented in Pitt and Khandker (1998) has been disputed on the grounds that the 
eligibility criteria of low land holdings was not enforced strictly in practice. In a reworking 
of the results focusing on what are claimed to be more directly comparable households 
no impact on consumption from participation in a program is found (Morduch 
1999:1605).11 Second, in the BIDs-World Bank survey data the ‘ultra poor’ (defined as 
those with less than 0.2 acres of land) form nearly 60% of participants and the likelihood 
of participation is strongly and negatively associated with level of land holding. 
Nonetheless, how much is borrowed depends principally on the entrepreneurship of 
households, so that the charge that the risk-averse very poor will benefit proportionately 
less has not been totally dispelled. Furthermore, the panel data reveals a relatively high 
dropout rate of around 30%, indicating that there may have been problems of repayment 
for many households. 
 
For Asia, there are examples of other studies that are either inconclusive or provide less 
convincing results. Coleman (1999) and MkNelly et al (1996) both focus on experiences 
with village banking in Thailand. Coleman (1999) utilizes data on villages that had 
participated in village bank micro finance schemes and those control villages that were 
designated as participants, but had not yet participated. As noted above this allows a 
double difference approach that compares the difference between income for 
participants and non-participants in program villages with the same difference in the 
control villages, where the programs were introduced later. From the results here the 
poverty impact of the schemes appears highly dubious. Months of village bank 
membership have no impact on any asset or income variables and there is no evidence 
that village bank loans were directed to productive purposes. The small size of loans 
means that they were largely used for consumption, but one of the reasons there is a 
weak poverty impact is that there was a tendency for wealthier households to self-select 
into village banks. 
 
Coleman (2004) uses the same survey data but reconsiders the estimation strategy to 
control for self-selection. He argues that the village bank methodology, which relies on 
self-selection by loan size and monitoring by frequent meetings, may not reach the 
poorest. As many better-off households tend to be on village bank committees, the 
failure to control for this leads to systematic biases. The regression results of Coleman 
(2004) indicate that there is substantial difference between ordinary members and 
committee members of village banks. The impact of microcredit on ordinary members’ 
wellbeing is either insignificantly different from zero or negative. On the contrary, the 
impact of microfinance programs on committee members’ measures of wealth, such as 
income, savings, productive expenses and labor time is positive, implying a form of 
program capture by the better-off in the village, even though this group may not be well–
off by national standards. A similar result in terms of rationing micro credit in favor of 
better-off groups or members is found by Doung and Izumida (2002) in a study of six 
villages in Viet Nam. There whilst credit availability is linked with production and income 
household economic position and prestige in a village plus the amount of credit applied 
for are the main determinants of how credit is allocated. 
                                                 
11 This debate, which in part centers around details of econometric estimation has not been resolved. An 
unpublished paper by Pitt reworks the original analysis to address the concerns of Morduch and is said to 
confirm the original results (Khandker 2003, footnote 1). 
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 MkNelly et al (1996) evaluated the Freedom from Hunger credit with education program 
in Thailand operated through village banks. The results show positive benefits, however 
although non-participants in non-program villages are used as controls, there are 
problems in accepting the results. No statistical tests are reported, so one cannot judge 
whether differences between participants and non-participants are significant.  There is 
also a potential measurement bias since the staff responsible for the program also did 
the interviewing. 
 
Chen and Snodgrass (2001) examine the operations of the Self Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) bank in India providing low income female clients in the informal 
sector with both saving and loan services. The study tests for the impact of these 
services by comparing the bank’s clients against a randomly selected control group in a 
similar geographic area. Two surveys were conducted two years apart. Average 
incomes rose over time for all groups – borrowers, savers and the control, although the 
increase was less for the latter. In terms of poverty incidence there was little overall 
change, although there was substantial ‘churning’, in that amongst the clients of SEWA 
there was quite a lot of movement above or below the poverty line. In interpreting these 
results Meyer (2002) argues that the evidence on the counterfactual – that is what would 
have happened to the clients in the absence of the services of SEWA - is not sufficiently 
strongly established to draw any firm conclusions on poverty impact. 
 
The smoothing of consumption over time to protect the poor against adverse shocks is 
one of the principle objectives of micro credit. Using data again for Bangladesh, Amin et 
al (2003) compute several measures of vulnerability.12 They find that the micro credit 
participants in the two villages covered are more likely to be below the poverty line than 
if they had been selected at random, so that the programs have reached the poor. 
However, the vulnerable are more likely to join a micro credit program in only one of the 
two villages. Further, for the vulnerable below the poverty line in one village there is no 
evidence that there are more likely to be members of a program and in the other village 
there is evidence that they have either chosen not to join or are actively excluded, 
presumably on the grounds that they are a poor credit risk. Hence the very poor and 
vulnerable do not appear to be reached.  
 
More positive conclusions in terms of the ability of micro finance to reduce vulnerability 
are found for Indonesia by Gertler et al (2003), who find that access to micro finance 
helps households smooth consumption in the face of declines in health of adult family 
members. Having established an empirical relationship between health condition and 
consumption, the authors test for a relation between access to a financial institution and 
consumption shortfalls associated with ill health. Using geographic distance as a 
measure of access they find that for households in an area with a BRI branch health 
shocks have no effect on consumption.  This study does not differentiate within the 
group of the poor. 
 
  III.2.  Poverty Impact Studies – Latin America 
 
 In Latin America in general the impact of microfinance on poverty has been less well 
documented both in a methodological sense and in terms of coverage in individual 
studies, which tend to be concentrated in a small number of countries, principally Bolivia 
                                                 
12 Unlike the Khandker studies this data picks up households before they joined a micro credit scheme. Their 
vulnerability measure is broader than simply fluctuations in consumption. 
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and Peru. The overall impression, however, is that compared with Asia microfinance has 
reached less far down the income scale and that a significant proportion of borrowers 
are not in fact below the poverty line, although they may well have below average 
incomes. This is likely to be due at least in part to a greater commercial orientation with 
a focus on credit for urban micro-enterprises, with lower rural outreach in Latin America 
as compared with other regions. A typical requirement for access to credit from an MFI 
has been that the borrower should be the owner of a micro-enterprise, holding a national 
identification card and having at least six to twelve months experience in the economic 
activity for which the loan is to be used (Gulli and Berger 1999:26). It is perhaps not 
surprising that many of the poor do not meet these criteria.  
 
For example, detailed evidence on the outreach of MFIs in Bolivia is provided by the 
survey reported in Navajas et al (2000), who use an index of basic needs fulfillment to 
classify borrowers into poor and non-poor groups. For the urban area of La Paz they find 
that of three MFIs, two tend to lend disproportionately to those above of the poverty line. 
For two of the three, the share of ‘moderately poor’ borrowers (at 29%) was lower than 
their share of the population (at 38%), although this was not the case for the third MFI, 
BancoSol (at 47%). However of the very poorest group the share of borrowers in all 
three institutions (at 2-5%) was well below their share in the population, reinforcing the 
view that MFIs have difficulty in reaching the very poor. When rural lending activities are 
also included there is a tendency for a skew in lending towards the ‘threshold’ group, 
defined as those just above the poverty line and the ‘moderately’ poor. Table 4 gives the 
ratio of the share of groups of borrowers by poverty class in the portfolio of the different 
MFIs to their share in total population. A figure above unity thus indicates a positive 
skew towards a particular poverty class and a figure below unity indicates the opposite. 
 
In terms of institutional mix FIE, PRODEM and Sartawi are NGOs, whilst BancoSol and 
Caja Los Andes are regulated financial institutions. Table 4 shows that being an NGO 
(like FIE) is no guarantee of strong allocation of loans to the poor and that both regulated 
institutions had a superior distribution to FIE. However in turn the rural-based NGOs, 
PRODEM and Sartawi outperform BancoSol by this criteria.  
 
Table 4 Distribution of MFI Lending by Poverty Classification Relative to 
Population Share in La Paz, Bolivia 
Urban  Fulfilled 
NonPoor 
Threshold 
NonPoor 
NonPoor 
subtotal 
Moderate 
Poor 
Poorest 
Poor 
Poor 
subtotal 
FIE 1.2 2.1 1.6 0.7 0.1 0.5 
Caja Los 
Andes 
0.7 2.9 1.5 0.8 0.2 0.6 
BancoSol 0.6 2.0 1.1 1.2 0.3 0.9 
Rural       
PRODEM 0.0 4.8 3.2 2.4 0.5 0.9 
Sartawi 1.6 4.4 3.5 2.2 0.5 0.9 
 Source: Navajas et al (2000) table 4. 
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This type of evidence on poverty outreach does not address the issue of how far 
incomes of poor borrowers have been affected. In the limited number of detailed poverty 
impact studies on Latin America, BancoSol of Bolivia remains by far the most studied 
institution. Hulme and Mosley (1996, table 4.1) look at a small sample of BancoSol 
borrowers. Using those approved borrowers who had not yet taken out a loan as a 
control they find an average annual increase in income of 28% for borrowers compared 
with an average of 14.5% for the control group. An estimated 8% of borrowers crossed 
the poverty line in 1992 alone. However in comparison with the MFIs from other 
countries in their study BancoSol has only a relatively small proportion of borrowers in 
the sample below the poverty line (29%) and average borrower household income from 
the sample was nearly five times the national poverty line, which is far higher than for 
any institution studied in other countries. BancoSol also showed the largest average 
absolute income increase for borrowers, and the proportionate increases were greater 
for the poor. Although the Hulme and Mosley study has a reasonable control group 
criteria (those approved borrowers who had not yet taken out a loan, but who might be 
expected to share the self-selection characteristics of current borrowers) it suffers from 
several problems; there is only a small sample of 36 borrowers; it is not clear that the 
control group matches borrowers exactly in terms of characteristics such as education, 
gender or sector of activity; and the sample is surveyed at a point in time so that 
retrospective income estimates are required to derive rates of change. 
 
 The last of these problems is addressed for BancoSol, but not the other Bolivian MFIs 
covered, in Mosley (2001), which resurveys the households covered earlier to obtain 
income data at two points in time. Mosley (2001) finds that for BancoSol borrowers re-
surveyed on average income growth was a little more than twice (214%) that of the 
control group; for the other three institutions the excess income growth for borrowers 
over the control group was between 132% and 158%. For poor borrowers (who were a 
minority of those surveyed) gains relative to the average for the control group were lower 
than for all borrowers, for example 151% in the case of BancoSol. Regression analysis 
relating income increase per household relative to the control group average to initial 
income shows a positive relationship, so that proportionate gains from borrowing rise 
with household income, although at a declining rate. There is a positive poverty impact, 
although given the fact that only a minority of borrowers (around one third) were poor at 
the starting point of the analysis in 1993, this is modest. Between 10%-20% of poor 
borrowers, varying between institutions, crossed the poverty line over the period studied 
as a result of microfinance.13 However when the core poor (those in ‘extreme poverty’ 
defined in Bolivia as those living on half the poverty line) are considered, it is clear that 
none of the MFIs studied are reaching them. From a sample of 200 borrowers over six 
years for four institutions, there is only one case of the removal of extreme poverty and 
hence this segment of the poor was not reached. 
 
 Dunn and Arbuckle (2001a, 2001b) use an analysis of covariance to examine loans to 
micro-enterprises for 305 households in Lima, Peru by Mibanco. The study draws on 
data at two points in time 1997 and 1999 and looks at changes in the borrowers relative 
to a control group of households who had not received a micro-enterprise loan. On 
average the borrower group appears to be around or slightly above the national poverty 
                                                 
13 There is some ambiguity in the interpretation of poverty impact since the definition of the headcount 
poverty index in the notes to table 5 in Mosley (2001) does not seem to match the explanation in the text. 
This refers to between 10 and 20 per cent ‘of borrowers’ crossing the poverty line as a consequence of 
microfinance. We take this to mean ‘of poor borrowers’ given the low poverty outreach reported in table 5. 
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line, with approximately 30% below the national poverty line. As noted above, the 
procedure uses matched observations in the borrower and control groups that have the 
same starting values for performance variables, like net revenue, assets or employment, 
as well as the same values for ‘moderating’ variables, like gender of entrepreneur, sector 
of activity and location. Change in the performance variables for the matched 
observations over 1997-1999 are compared to establish if there are significant 
differences between the borrowers and the control group. The results suggest on 
average a significant difference in terms of enterprise revenue (roughly $1000 annually), 
fixed assets and employment creation (as much as nine extra days per month). These 
results are very substantial. The study however recognizes that it may be difficult to 
attribute all of these changes to the microcredit program of Mibanco, as the matching 
system used does not address adequately self-selection bias and the moderating 
variables used seem crude (for example, sector variables reported are ‘commercial, 
service and industrial’ rather than anything more precise such as industrial subsectors).   
 
The poverty dimension of the study as reported in Dunn and Arbuckle (2001b) shows a 
positive poverty reduction effect. For households starting with the same poverty level, 
number of income sources and economically active members in 1997, on balance after 
net effects are allowed for by 1999 borrowers were 6% more likely to be above the 
poverty line than non-borrowers. There is the contrary result, however, that in the 
smaller group of new borrowers who took out a loan during 1997-1999, but not initially in 
1997, new borrowers were 15% less likely to have moved out of poverty than the control 
group.14 The poor and non-poor appear to benefit almost equally in absolute terms, 
although there is evidence that the poorer borrowers were 20% more likely to liquidate 
assets in response to a financial shock. 
 
Banegas et al (2002) look at the operations of two MFIs in Ecuador (Banco Solidario) 
and Bolivia (Caja los Andes) utilizing the CGAP poverty index noted above to establish 
outreach and a logit regression model (where being a client and taking a loan gives a 
dependent variable of 1.0 and being a non-client a dependent variable of zero) that links 
participation in a program with income changes and poverty scores. It is found that for 
both institutions taking a loan is associated with increases in income. However income 
change is measured not by the size of monetary values but by a simple scoring system 
(1 for income decrease, 2 for unchanged income and 3 for income increase). The 
relation with poverty varies since in the case of Banco Solidario lower poverty is 
associated with a greater probability of taking a loan and in the case of Caja los Andes 
with a higher probability. On the other hand Banco Solidario has a greater depth of 
outreach as 75% of its clients belonged to the lower and intermediate groups as defined 
by the CGAP poverty score, as compared with 48% for Caja los Andes. Again it seems 
therefore it is the better-off amongst the poor who are benefiting. Limitations of this 
analysis are the crudity of some of the indicators, for example for income change, and 
the way in which a control group of non-clients are selected; that is from households in 
the same locality that have micro-enterprises in the same sector as the borrowers and 
which have not had a loan from a formal sector institution. This simply ignores the issue 
of self-selection bias and does not control for factors like education and skills. 
 
                                                 
14 To explain this worrying result the authors suggest that as the poverty measure is expenditure based new 
borrowers may curtail their consumption in the short-term to invest in their micro-enterprise at the same time 
as they take out a new loan and that this lower consumption may show up as higher poverty in the short-
term.  
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From a nutritional perspective MkNelly and Dunford (1999) look at the impact of Credit 
with Education loans to women in rural Bolivia. A relatively rigorous approach is applied 
by collecting data two years apart from a participant group and a control group, who 
would be offered the credit at the end of the study period. In addition amongst the 
participants a sub-group of those who joined during the course of the study, rather than 
immediately, is examined separately. Small loans were available in combination for 
training in health and nutrition, as well as micro-enterprise management topics. Roughly 
two-thirds of participants reported an increase in income over the study period and their 
net incomes in 1997 appeared far higher than the control group (perhaps casting some 
doubt on the representativeness of the latter). However on the key concern of the study, 
nutritional status (for example child height-for-age or weight-for-height measures), there 
is little evidence of any impact due to the program. The most positive result is that for 
households suffering ‘food stress’, participants are less likely to sell off animals and are 
more likely to take out loans as a coping strategy, than are non-participants. 
  
In general, for Latin America the available studies suggest that MFIs, whilst they may be 
flourishing in commercial terms, and providing a valuable service to micro-enterprises 
often run by poor entrepreneurs, have relatively weak impact on those at the very bottom 
of the income distribution. 
 
IV.  Forms of Microcredit Interventions and Cost-Effectiveness 
 
It is clear that experimentation and local variation are likely to be important aspects of 
successful MFIs. A few studies (more in Asia than in Latin America) have looked in detail 
at the impact and cost effectiveness of different forms of intervention. The Hulme and 
Mosley (1996) cross-country study of 13 institutions in seven countries (Bolivia in Latin 
America and Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia in Asia) found that loan impact, 
in terms of change in borrower income, (which is not necessary the same as poverty 
impact) was greater in the more financially viable institutions (such as BRI and 
BancoSol). They explain this in terms of the screening efficiency of higher interest rates 
and tighter repayment conditions, which deter less financially sound borrowers. The 
institutions involved used a range of delivery mechanisms and the analysis does not 
allow firm judgements between these. Within-country comparisons by ownership are 
made explicitly in Park and Ren (2001), who look at the Chinese experience drawing on 
household survey data for 1997. They are able to compare three types of program 
based on ownership characteristics - NGO-based, mixed programs and government 
ownership. Whether in terms of conventional financial criteria like repayment rates, or 
measures of initial impact like targeting effectiveness, the NGO programs appear to 
function best, with the government-run programs the least successful. 
 
Detailed mechanisms for micro lending are examined for Thailand by Kaboski and 
Townsend (2003) who look at different institutional variants such as production credit 
groups, women’s groups, rice banks and buffalo banks, as well as a variety of services 
included training and various savings facilities. Of the forms of institution, allowing for a 
range of other factors, women’s groups appear to have the largest positive impact on 
their members. Of the services offered, training in conjunction with credit appears to 
work well and the availability of savings facilities appears to be associated with asset 
growth amongst households. Of the savings services regular ‘pledged savings’ have the 
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largest positive impact. Explanations offered for this include the use of savings as 
collateral for further loans either from the institution itself or from other sources, and a 
reduction in the cost and risk of infrequent deposits and withdrawals. However since the 
poorest may not be in a position of offer regular savings, this also provides an 
explanation for why they may benefit relatively less from MFIs.15  
 
Most studies of the impact of different forms of micro finance do not conduct a full cost 
effectiveness analysis in order to judge both the effectiveness of different alternatives 
and how micro finance interventions compare in efficiency terms with other ways of 
reaching the poor. However there is often a general expectation that MFIs are an 
effective and efficient means of reaching the poor. For example, Wright (2000) argues 
that “...microfinance has a particular advantage over almost (and probably) all other 
interventions” in providing cost-effective and sustainable services to the poor. In fact the 
evidence to support such a strong claim is not yet available. Bangladesh and Bolivia, the 
most widely studied countries for microfinance, provide most of the evidence on its cost 
effectiveness. 
 
The early work by Khandker (1998) attempts to assess the cost-effectiveness of micro 
credit in Bangladesh (that is costs per taka of consumption for the poor) as compared 
with more formal financial institutions and other poverty-targeted interventions. His data 
are summarized in table 5. They appear to be based on the assumption of a zero 
leakage rate to the non-poor. The interesting result that emerges is that the Grameen 
Bank is considerably more cost-effective than BRAC and that as expected loans to 
female borrowers are considerably more cost-effective than loans to males. Further, 
subsidies to Grameen (but not to BRAC) appear to be a more cost effective means of 
reaching the poor than various food for work programs. However a food for education 
scheme appears very cost- effective relative to the food-for-work programs and to 
BRAC.16  Formal financial institutions are less cost-effective than Grameen for both 
female and male borrowers and less cost effective than BRAC in some, both not all, 
cases examined (Khandker 1998:134-139). The high figure for BRAC is in part due to 
the range of services, such as training, offered in addition it micro credit, but nonetheless 
if such services are essential to the success of microcredit, including their cost in a cost-
benefit assessment of microcredit is legitimate. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Fujita (2000) makes this point in the context of Bangladesh 
16 The study on this scheme by Wodon (1998) appears considerably more sophisticated than the other 
studies and compares costs with the future stream of estimated benefits to the poor in terms of gains from 
education. The ratio for this activity may not be directly comparable with the other figures in the table. 
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Table 5 Cost Effectiveness Ratiosa: Bangladesh Early 1990’s 
 
Intervention  Female  Male All borrowers 
Grameen Bank  0.91 1.48  
BRAC 3.53 2.59  
Agricultural 
Development bank 
(BKB)b 
  4.88 
Agricultural 
Development bank 
(RAKUB)c 
  3.26 
Vulnerable Group 
Development 
  1.54 
Food for Work 
(CARE)d 
  2.62 
Food for Work (World 
Food programme) 
  1.71 
Food for Educatione   0.94 (1.79) 
Source: Khandker (1998) tables 7.2 and 7.3 and Wodon (1998) 
Notes:  a) Ratio of costs to income gains to the poor. 
             b) Bangladesh Krishi bank 
             c) Rajshahi Krishi Unnayan bank   
             d) Run by CARA on behalf of USAID 
             e) Source is Wodon (1998); figure in brackets is the cost effectiveness ratio for the very 
poor. 
 
The above data provide ambigous support for the idea that micro-finance is a cost- 
effective means of generating income for the poor. The figures for Grameen support this 
view, whilst those for BRAC do not. More recently a couple of other estimates are 
available. Burgess and Pande (2003) examine whether the pattern of commercial bank 
expansion in India into rural areas, previously not served by banks (so-called ‘social 
banking’), has impacted on rural poverty and their work allows a simple comparison with 
microfinance. Their estimates suggest that it costs 2.72 rupees to generate an additional 
rupee of income for the poor via social banking program. Compared with the data in 
table 5 this ratio is higher than the cost-effectiveness ratio for Grameen, but lower than 
that for BRAC.17  
 
                                                 
17 It should be noted that the benefits from Grameen lending found in Khandker (2003), which are almost 
half of those found in his earlier study, imply considerably higher cost effectiveness ratios to those reported 
in table 5, unless there has been a corresponding rise in the efficiency of operations. 
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A further look at the effectiveness of Grameen is provided by Schreiner (2003), who 
calculates the subsidy-lending ratio at 0.22 over the period 1983-97. This is not directly 
equivalent to the ratios in table 5, but assuming the same return to borrowing as in 
Khandker (1998) these figures can be converted into a broadly equivalent ratio of cost to 
gains to the poor of 1.15. This is consistent with the figures in table 5 which would need 
to be averaged to give an overall return to male and female borrowing combined. The 
result confirms Grameen as a relatively cost-effective form of poverty intervention, 
although it says nothing about how the benefits from its activities are distributed between 
the poor, the very poor and those above the poverty line. 
 
 For Latin America, Mosley (2001) provides a rare, if approximate, estimate of cost-
effectiveness of MFIs relative to other poverty interventions in Bolivia. He compares the 
estimated numbers in a particular area brought over the poverty line by four different 
MFIs, as a result of microcredit, with the organizations’ expenditure that can be allocated 
to activities in that area. This gives a cost per person brought out of poverty for four MFIs 
that use different approaches. BancoSol and Fundacion para la Promocion y Desarollo 
de la Microempresa (PRODEM) are more commercial with greater use of individual 
loans, whilst ProMujer lends largely to women in urban co-operative groups and Sartawi 
offers both group and individual loans, but also provides a range of training and 
education services in addition to credit. Cost-effectiveness in the MFIs, defined as the 
cost per person brought out of poverty, are $603 for BancoSol, $467 for ProMujer, $373 
for PRODEM and $589 for Sartawi. These figures are not directly comparable with those 
for Bangladesh reported in table 5, as the latter are the ratio of MFI costs to benefit in 
income (or consumption) received by the poor. Although the range is relatively wide, 
perhaps due to the approximate nature of the calculations, the author himself suggests 
that they show that there is little difference between the institutions and that no one 
model dominates microcredit delivery in Bolivia (or indeed elsewhere). There are also 
some approximate comparisons with the cost of poverty reduction from Social Fund 
investment in health, education and rural roads, which show microfinance from all of the 
institutions to be lower cost than the Social Fund programs.18 However, the cost 
effectiveness figures found for MFIs Bolivia in dollars per person brought out of poverty 
are much higher than some of the anecdotal figures used for Bangladesh. The fact these 
estimates, approximate as they are, provide one of the few indications of the cost-
effectiveness of MFIs in Latin America is an indication of the undeveloped nature of 
research on this issue in the region. 
 
In general in terms of cost-effectiveness there is limited support for the view that MFIs 
can be cost-effective ways of reaching the poor, although the range of figures within both 
Bangladesh and Bolivia suggest that this is far from inevitable for all types of MFI. BRAC 
in particular appears relatively high cost. However even if it could be shown that 
microfinance uniformly outperformed other targeting measures in cost effectiveness 
terms one could still not conclude that other measures should be abandoned and their 
funds diverted to microfinance. As Khandker (1998) points out, participants to 
microfinance borrowing self-select (that is they judge that micro credit suits their 
particular needs, often for self employed work), whilst microfinance may not be suitable 
                                                 
18 As defined in Mosley (2001) table 5 the indicators for the MFIs and the Social Fund programs are not 
directly comparable as the former are cost per person brought out of poverty and the latter are cost per 
income benefit received by the poor.  Additional assumptions would have be used to convert the ratios for 
the Social Fund programs to cost per person brought out of poverty, but these are not referred to. 
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for others amongst the poor.  For this latter group, perhaps more risk adverse or more 
disadvantaged, other forms of targeting will still be required.  
 
V.  Conclusions 
  
Despite the current enthusiasm among the donor community for microfinance programs, 
rigorous research on the outreach, impact and cost-effectiveness of such programs is 
rare.  Design of aid programs would ideally incorporate evidence on all three points, but 
the research that does exist generally focuses on only one of these criteria: either 
outreach, impact or cost-effectiveness.  In part this reflects the difficulty of establishing 
an appropriate statistical methodology and implementing those standards in practice, 
and in part no doubt reflects the variation found in practice in the way in which 
microfinance operates.  The evidence surveyed here suggests that the conclusion from 
the early literature, that whilst microfinance clearly may have had positive impacts on 
poverty it is unlikely to be a simple panacea for reaching the core poor, remains broadly 
valid.  Reaching the core poor is difficult and some of the reasons that made them 
difficult to reach with conventional financial instruments mean that they may also be high 
risk and therefore unattractive microfinance clients. 
 
 Asia has much to learn from Latin America in terms of developing a vibrant 
commercially oriented MFI sector. However MFIs in Latin America have often been seen 
as a vehicle for the development of the micro-enterprise sector rather than as a tool for 
the removal of core poverty, which was its initial focus in much of Asia. Work on Bolivia 
has demonstrated this at least for that country. There has been an extensive debate that 
we do not touch on here, on the financial sustainability of MFIs. We would simply make 
the point that just because an institution needs a subsidy to cover its costs in itself is not 
a reason for not supporting the institution. The issue would be what benefits, in terms of 
income gains for the poor, can be achieved with the subsidy and how the ratio of subsidy 
to benefits compares with that for other interventions. Detailed cost effectiveness studies 
are rare and those that are available show both high and low scores for MFIs in the 
same country. Hence there is a need to continually improve design and outreach and to 
see MFIs as part of the package for targeting the poor, rather than the whole solution.  
 
Our view is that despite the difficulties, there is a need for more careful research on the 
outreach, impact and cost-effectiveness of microfinance programs - studies that 
rigorously address the critical issues of selection and placement bias.  Such studies can 
inform the debate on the way forward for microfinance by sharpening the donor 
community’s understanding of the role of microfinance in reaching the poor, its impact in 
different environments, and its cost-effectiveness as a poverty intervention.   
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